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I. INTRODUCTION
V IRTUALLY all federal appeals involve the question of costs
because prevailing parties are usually entitled to the award of
costs upon resolution of the appeal. Obtaining a cost award is of
increasing importance, since such costs often can mount into the
thousands of dollars.
* This article is an expanded version of Chapter 20 in E. WERTHEIMER,
APPEALS TO THE THIRD CIRCUIT (1986). Copyright 1986 by Butterworth Legal
Publishers, 84 Montvale Ave., Stoneham, Mass. 02180. Used with permission.
t Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. Yale College,
1975;J.D. Yale Law School, 1979.
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The rules for obtaining an award of appellate costs, however,
are surprisingly inaccessible, making the procedure a potential
pitfall for all but the most experienced appellate advocate. The
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide the starting point,
but there are many other sources, both statutory and decisional,
that must be consulted before a complete award may be obtained.
This article discusses the award of costs in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: who pays them and under
what circumstances; what items are taxable as costs; when costs
will be assessed as a penalty; and how to secure or dispute their
award. The purpose of the article is to provide practitioners with
the basic information needed to apply for, obtain, or oppose cost
awards in the Third Circuit.
The provisions of rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure' are the starting point for determining when appellate
1. FED. R. App. P. 39. Rule 39 provides:
(a) To Whom Allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if
an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless
otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment
is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise
ordered; if a judgment is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the ap-
pellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment is affirmed or reversed
in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed only as ordered by the
court.
(b) Costs For and Against the United States. In cases involving
the United States or an agency or officer thereof, if an award of costs
against the United States is authorized by law, costs shall be awarded in
accordance with the provisions of subdivision (a); otherwise, costs shall
not be awarded for or against the United States.
(c) Costs of Briefs, Appendices, and Copies of Records. By local
rule the court of appeals shall fix the maximum rate at which the cost of
printing or otherwise producing necessary copies of briefs, appendices,
and copies of records authorized by Rule 30(f) shall be taxable. Such
rate shall not be higher than that generally charged for such work in the
area where the clerk's office is located and shall encourage the use of
economical methods of printing and copying.
(d) Bill of Costs; Objections; Costs to be Inserted in Mandate or
Added Later. A party who desires such costs to be taxed shall state
them in an itemized and verified bill of costs which the party shall file
with the clerk, with proof of service, within 14 days after the entry of
judgment. Objections to the bill of costs must be filed within 10 days of
service on the party against whom costs are to be taxed unless the time
is extended by the court. The clerk shall prepare and certify an item-
ized statement of costs taxed in the court of appeals for insertion in the
mandate, but the issuance of the mandate shall not be delayed for taxa-
tion of costs and if the mandate has been issued before final determina-
tion of costs, the statement, or any amendment thereof, shall be added
to the mandate upon request by the clerk of the court of appeals to the
clerk of the district court.
(e) Costs on Appeal Taxable in the District Courts. Costs in-
curred in the preparation and transmission of the record, the cost of
1006 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1005
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costs will be awarded since the Third Circuit has no local rules
concerning the awarding of costs. This article takes into account
the revisions of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure through
March 10, 1986.
II. WHO PAYS THE COSTS?
A. General Considerations
If an appeal is dismissed, for whatever reason, the appellant
(the party bringing the appeal) shoulders the costs of the appeal
unless the parties agree otherwise, 2 or the court orders payment
by one of the other parties. 3 The Third Circuit has exercised this
discretion on a number of occasions. In one case, the Third Cir-
cuit required the appellee to contribute to the cost of printing the
record despite dismissal on appeal for lack ofjurisdiction.4 The
court's division of costs resulted from its belief that the appellee
had requested a record which was far more extensive than was
necessary for the court to decide the issue.5 In an admiralty case,
however, the Third Circuit denied costs to either party because
the parties failed to provide an adequate appendix. 6
When a judgment is affirmed on appeal, the costs are taxed
against the appellant unless otherwise ordered by the court.7
the reporter's transcript, if necessary for the determination of the ap-
peal, the premiums paid for cost of supersedeas bonds or other bonds
to preserve rights pending appeal, and the fee for filing the notice of
appeal shall be taxed in the district court as costs of the appeal in favor
of the party entitled to costs under this rule.
Id.
2. FED. R. App. P. 39(a). The Third Circuit has noted that it is not bound to
assess costs in accord with the parties' agreement since the parties cannot deny
the court's power under rule 39 to assess costs. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co.,
630 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1980) (court found no evidence of agreement that trustees
would bear cost of printing appendices). For a further discussion of Penn Central,
see infra notes 73-76 & 91-92 and accompanying text.
3. FED. R. App. P. 39(a). For the text of rule 39, see supra note 1.
4. Missouri-Kansas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 108 F.2d 614 (3d Cir.
1939) (decided under former Third Circuit Court Rule 29), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
687 (1940).
5. 108 F.2d at 615. In Missouri-Kansas Pipeline, the transcript consisted of
1486 pages but the appellant only printed 361. Id. The appellee printed the
balance. Id. Since such an extensive record was not necessary, three-fourths of
the printing costs were taxed to the appellee. Id.
6. The Chickie, 141 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1944). In Chickie, the parties failed to
provide an appendix as required by the court rules. Id. at 86. The court was
forced to rely on the transcripts of the court below, as the parties had not pro-
vided the pleadings, which were important to the limited liability issue in the
case. Id.
7. FED. R. App. P. 39(a). See also Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland &
Co., 407 F.2d 881 (C.C.P.A. 1969). In Morehouse, 20 pages of printed record
3
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When a judgment is reversed, costs are assessed against the
appellee.8
In an appeal in which the lower court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part, or in which a judgment is vacated, the court will
exercise its discretion to determine who is to pay the costs on
appeal. Rule 39 provides that "costs shall be allowed only as or-
dered by the court."9 Rule 39(a) reflects the difficulty of deter-
mining who is the prevailing party where each party has prevailed
on at least one issue. This difficulty means that no automatic rule
is workable.
Where the losing party in a suit involving the United States
has proceeded in forma pauperis,l° courts have required that the
were added at the request of the appellee. Id. at 889. Since the court found the
material pertinent and helpful in understanding the issues, the court taxed the
printing costs against the appellant. Id. For the text of rule 39, see supra note 1.
8. FED. R. App. P. 39(a). For the text of rule 39(a), see supra note 1.
9. FED. R. App. P. 39(a). See also Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Trainer,
601 F.2d 1306, 1319 (5th Cir. 1979). In Trainer, the court ordered the clerk to
assess costs one-half against the defendant and one-half against one of two
plaintiffs. Id. Trainer involved a petition to set aside an order of the Benefits
Review Board ("Board") awarding death benefits under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 1308. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the award of benefits to the child of the deceased. Id. at 1309. The court va-
cated the award to the widow of the deceased and remanded the case to the
Board for further determinations. Id. Thus, the court directed the clerk to as-
sess costs under the rule 39 provisions only against the defendant and the widow
of the deceased. See id. at 1319 & n.20.
There are other situations in which courts have exercised their discretion
with regard to the award of costs. See, e.g., Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362, 370 (9th
Cir. 1979) (under Freedom of Information Act, it is for district court to decide
whether plaintiff "substantially prevailed," allowing award of costs against
United States), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980); Jones v. Schellenberger, 225
F.2d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 1955) (court's discretion exercised to "fullest extent"
against prevailing party whose conduct prolonged litigation and increased
costs), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956); County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior,
76 F.R.D. 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (non-prevailing parties allowed costs based on
policy considerations; decided under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)); Bourazak v. North
River Ins. Co., 280 F. Supp. 87 (S.D. Ill. 1968) (court of appeals in proper case
may exercise its discretion and tax prevailing party).
10. Informapauperis describes the permission given to a poor litigant to pro-
ceed without liability for court fees or costs, if the court is satisfied as to his or
her indigence. See Phillips v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 153 F. 795, 797
(C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907) (in forma pauperis statutes are intended to permit litigants,
who are unable in good faith to prosecute suit on account of poverty, to obtain
fair adjudication of their rights), aff'd, 164 F. 1022 (1908). For a discussion of
the English common law origin of the in forma pauperis doctrine, see Cook v.
Imperial Tobacco Co., [1922] 2 LJ.K.B. 771.
The federal informa pauperis statute provides:
Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or crimi-
nal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security
thereof, by a person who makes an affidavit that he is unable to pay
1008 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1005
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government pay its own costs. ' I
Where an appeal involves multiple parties, the court in its
discretion will determine who is to pay the costs.' 2 Intervenors
will be awarded costs only if they have made a "substantial" con-
tribution to the resolution of the issues.' 3 The United States
such costs or give security thereof. Such affidavit shall state the nature
of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled to
redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982). The statute also provides that the expense of print-
ing the record on appeal, when required by the appellate court, will be borne by
the United States if the litigant presents an affidavit. Id. § 1915(b). Subsections
(c), (d), and (e) of the statute deal with the procedural aspects of the rule. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(c), (d), (e) (1982). For a general discussion of § 1915, see C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2673 (1983); Com-
ment, Petitions to Sue In Forma Pauperis in Federal Courts. Standards and Procedures for
the Exercise ofJudicial Discretion, 56 B.U.L. REV. 745 (1976).
11. See Henry v. United States, 424 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1970). Henry
involved an action by the government to recover under the False Claims Act for
fraudulent sale of pine oil disinfectant. Id. at 678 (citation omitted). The district
court awarded damages to the United States upon a finding that the defendant
partnership submitted five false invoices to the government. Id. at 678. Leave to
appeal informa pauperis was granted to one of the partners. Id.
On appeal, the court concluded that the assets of the partnership could be
reached because one of the partners had committed fraud. Id. at 679. The court
decided, however, that the appellant's personal assets could not be reached as
she did not contribute to the fraud. Id. The case was remanded to the district
court only to assess the actual damages against the appellant individually. Id.
The government was directed to pay its own costs as the appeal was heard in
forma pauperis. Id.
Under rule 39(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, costs may
only be assessed against the United States when authorized by statute. FED. R.
App. P. 39(b). For a discussion of rule 39(b), see infra notes 21-28 and accompa-
nying text.
12. See Mobile Power Enters. v. Power Vac, Inc., 496 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir.
1974) (settlement between plaintiff and one codefendant did not transform
other codefendant, in whose favor no judgment was entered, into a "prevailing
party"); Modick v. Carvel Stores, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (costs
were properly assessed against unsuccessful plaintiff even though his claim was
consolidated with that of successful plaintiff for trial).
13. See Delta Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 505 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir.
1974). In Delta, the court recognized that costs on appeal are taxed in accord-
ance with rule 39. Id. at 387. The court noted, however, that "situations inevita-
bly arise in which the rule is not specifically dispositive." Id. The court
determined that rule 39 favors taxing costs in favor of the prevailing party, but
stated that beyond this, taxation of costs is a matter within the court's discretion.
Id. The court reviewed the manner in which other circuits assessed costs for or
against intervenors, finding that the majority of circuits treated intervenors "like
any other prevailing or losing party," and concluded that the intervenors could
recover costs as prevailing parties who "substantially contributed" to the resolu-
tion of the case. Id. at 377-88 (citations omitted). See also American Public Gas
Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(no substantial contribution since briefs of intervenors were duplicative of brief
of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
10, § 2667, at 191.
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, for example, has held
that if the intervenors have made a substantial contribution, the
court then will
consider whether the amount claimed should be reduced
to reflect [an] estimate of the value of the contribution
and the extent to which the brief for which costs are
claimed, despite its original contribution, contained
materials duplicative of material in the [original party's]
presentation.... [A]wards of costs in favor of interven-
ors in such cases will not be favored.' 4
The Third Circuit has used other cost adjusting measures,
and has held that a party that prevails in a mandamus action is
entitled to costs and that costs should be assessed in the same
manner as the district court assesses costs under rule 54(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 However, the judge, a nomi-
nal respondent in mandamus, will not be responsible for these
costs. 16 Further, in a bankruptcy case, the Third Circuit has held
that receivers may not collect costs from the bankrupt party.17
14. American Ry. Supervisor's Ass'n v. United States, 582 F.2d 1066, 1067
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). In American Railway, the court ap-
plied this standard and denied the railroads' application for costs. 582 F.2d at
1067. The American Railway case involved a petition for rehearing on the issue of
costs previously granted in favor of the railroads as intervenors against the
American Railway Supervisors' Association. Id. On rehearing, the court
granted the railroads' costs only in accordance with their contribution as inter-
venors. Id. at 1068. The court stated that, although the intervenors' brief simi-
larly explained the reasons for the regulation at issue in the case, the brief made
a substantial contribution to the clarity of the rule at issue. Id.
Other courts have also applied the "substantial contribution" standard. See
American Trucking Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 666 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1982) (intervenors whose brief added little to case were to bear their own
costs, while intervenors who made successful attacks on regulations were
awarded costs accordingly); American Public Gas Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regu-
latory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (no substantial contribution as
briefs were identical).
15. Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 530 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1976).
In Cotler, the court recognized that rule 39 does not expressly provide for the
assessment of costs in a mandamus proceeding. Id. at 538. The court noted that
mandamus jurisdiction is conferred by the All Writs Act as an original action at
law. Id. at 538 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976)). The court concluded that there
is no reason why costs should not be awarded as in any action at law. Id. at 538.
See also Arizona v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz., 709 F.2d 521
(9th Cir. 1983) (citing Coter in awarding costs in mandamus action).
16. Coder v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 530 F.2d 536, 538 (3d Cir.
1976). See also In re Haight & Freese Co., 164 F. 688, 690 (1st Cir. 1980) ("It
would be contrary to the fundamental rule protecting the freedom of judicial
action to tax costs against a judge . . . [for] failure to apprehend the law
correctly.").
17. United States v. Larchwood Gardens, Inc., 420 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1970).
6
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The above rules governing the taxation of costs are subject
to statutory preemption. Indeed, rule 39(a) by its own terms ap-
plies "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law."' 8 A statute may
thus alter the usual award of costs.' 9 An example of such an alter-
ation is 28 U.S.C. § 1928, which forbids the award of costs to a
successful plaintiff in a patent infringement suit when the paten-
tee claims to be, but turns out not to be, the original inventor and
does not file a disclaimer prior to commencement of the action. 20
Where there is no specific statute governing the particular
kind of case on appeal, and no exception applies, courts will ad-
here to the usual practice of awarding costs on appeal to the pre-
vailing party.
B. The United States as a Party
Rule 39(b) specifically addresses the situation where the
In Larchwood, the receivers (appellees) were appointed by the district court in an
action brought by the United States when the corporation defaulted on federal
loans. Id. at 532. The district court awarded the receivers' costs. Id. The Third
Circuit vacated the order and remanded for incorporation of certain amounts it
approved. Id. On remand, the receivers asked for supplemental costs for ex-
penses on appeal, which costs were awarded by the district court. Id. On the
second appeal, the Third Circuit determined that the receivers must bear their
own costs on appeal. Id. at 535. See also In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 432
F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1970) (trustee and his attorney paid cost of brief and docket-
ing fees without reimbursement from debtor's estate).
18. FED. R. App. P. 39(a). For the text of rule 39(a), see supra note 1.
19. FED. R. App. P. 39 advisory committee note.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1928 (1982). Section 1928 specifically provides:
Whenever a judgment is rendered for the plaintiff in any patent in-
fringement action involving a part of a patent and it appears that the
patentee, in his specifications, claimed to be, but was not, the original
and first inventor or discoverer of any material or substantial part of the
thing patented, no costs shall be included in such judgment, unless the
proper disclaimer has been filed in the Patent Office prior to the com-
mencement of the action.
Id. See also Gottschalk Mfg. v. Springfield Wire & Tinsel Co., 75 F.2d 907 (1st
Cir. 1935) (statute applies to district courts, courts of appeals, and Supreme
Court).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
reached an interesting result in the "snail darter" case with respect to costs and
attorneys' fees requested by the prevailing party in an action in which the award-
ing of costs was governed by another federal statute. See Hill v. Tennessee Val-
ley Auth., 84 F.R.D. 226 (E.D. Tenn. 1979). The district court in Hill disallowed
the award of costs and attorneys' fees, stating that it was irritated that the plain-
tiffs petitioned for costs more than two years after the district court's order, and
more than a year after the Supreme Court's final decision in the case. Id. at 227-
29. The original action and the request for costs had been filed under the En-
dangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4), which allows a court to award
costs when "issuing any final order." 84 F.R.D. at 227.
19861 1011
7
Wertheimer: Award of the Costs of Taking an Appeal in the Third Circuit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
United States is a party to an appeal. 2 1 Prior to the enactment of
uniform appellate rules, the general view was that no award of
costs could be granted in favor of the United States. 22
1. The United States as a Party in Civil Cases
The award of costs against the United States is allowed in
civil cases by rule 39(b) only when such an award is authorized by
law. 23 This authorization is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a), 24 which
places the United States on an equal plane with other litigants in
civil appeals. 25 Thus, in the absence of a statute to the contrary,
the United States may receive an award of costs and also may be
subject to paying the costs to the other party-litigants.2 6 Conse-
quently, rule 39(b) applies in most civil litigation in which the
United States is involved.
2. The United States as a Party in Criminal Cases
There is statutory authority for the United States to seek the
21. FED. R. App. P. 39(b). For the text of rule 39(b), see supra note 1.
22. Before being amended in 1966, § 2412(a) of title 28 of the United
States Code allowed costs to the United States only where provided for by act of
Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1964), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. V
1965-1969).
23. FED. R. App. P. 39(b).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1982).
25. Id. Section 2412(a) provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for
costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title, but not including the
fees and expenses of attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party
in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency
and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity
in any court having jurisdiction of such action. A judgment for costs
when taxed against the United States shall, in an amount established by
statute, court rule, or order, be limited to reimbursing in whole or in
part the prevailing party for the costs incurred by such party in the
litigation.
Id.
26. See, e.g., Citizens Council v. Brinegar, 741 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1984) (De-
partment of Transportation liable for attorneys' fees upon failing to justify omis-
sion of environmental impact statement); Natural Resources Defense Council v.
EPA, 703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983) (§ 2412 applicable to petition for attorneys'
fees incurred in review proceedings pursuant to Clean Water Act); Collorafi v.
United States, 579 F. Supp. 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiffs liable for govern-
ment's costs and expenses where plaintiffs ignored Declaratory Judgment Act
and sought declaratory relief in federal tax controversy); Nunes-Correia v. Haig,
543 F. Supp. 812 (D.D.C. 1982) (mere absence of bad faith or deliberate abuse
does not absolve government of liability for expenses); United States v. Tracinda
Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (in view of complex questions of
law, court exercised discretionary power to award costs to defendants in Clayton
Act proceeding). For a discussion of the development of § 2412, see C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 10, § 2672, at 236-42.
[Vol. 3 1: p. 10051012
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award of costs against an unsuccessful criminal defendant, 27 but
this statute refers only to federal district courts. 28 A successful
criminal defendant apparently has no right to have costs imposed
against the United States. If the government may obtain its costs
at the district court level, then presumably the court of appeals,
under rule 39, may award costs of the appeal to the government
where appropriate.
II. COSTS IMPOSED AS A PENALTY
A. Liability of Parties for Costs
Rule 39 generally controls the disposition of costs. 29 How-
ever, rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should
be consulted when appropriate. Rule 38 provides, "If a court of
appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award
just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." 30
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1918 (1982). Section 1918 provides:
(a) Costs shall be included in any judgment, order, or decree ren-
dered against any person for the violation of an Act of Congress in
which a civil fine or forfeiture of property is provided for.
(b) Whenever any conviction for any offense not capital is obtained in
a district court, the court may order that the defendant pay the costs of
prosecution.
Id. See also United States v. Am. Theater Corp., 526 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1975)
(taxation of costs in nondiscriminatory manner under § 1918 does not violate
fifth or sixth amendments), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 938 (1977); Bachner v. United
States, 517 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1975) (court found it inconceivable that defend-
ant's plea of guilty would have been affected by knowledge of liability for court
costs of prosecution).
Specific criminal statutes may also expressly provide that a defendant is lia-
ble for the costs of prosecution. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982) (making in-
come tax evasion a felony and imposing fine of not more than $10,000).
In determining what costs are to be taxed, the court will be guided by 28
U.S.C. § 1920, which applies both to civil and criminal cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1920
(1982). See also United States v. Procario, 361 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1966) (criminal
prosecution for evasion of income tax). The imposition of costs in a criminal
proceeding under the authority of § 1918 is discretionary with the government,
which must initiate the demand for costs to be imposed. The government is not
always successful in obtaining costs. See United States v. Pommerening, 500
F.2d 92 (10th Cir.) (court did not grant costs for witnesses who did not testify),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974); United States v. Deas, 413 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir.
1969) (separate court costs from previous mistrial due solely to jury's failure to
agree cannot be taxed to subsequently convicted defendant); Gleckman v.
United States, 80 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1935) (defendants not liable for jury's fees,
mileage, bailiffs, jury, lodging, and medical expenses), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 709
(1936).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1918 (1982). For the text of § 1918, see supra note 27.
29. For the full text of rule 39, see supra note 1.
30. FED. R. App. P. 38. In discussing the purposes of rule 38, the Second
Circuit has stated, "Rule 38 is not premised on a showing of delay in prosecut-
ing on appeal.... Rather the determination is one of doing justice between the
1986] 1013
9
Wertheimer: Award of the Costs of Taking an Appeal in the Third Circuit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
In order for rule 38 to apply, the court first must determine
that the appeal was frivolous. 3 1 A frivolous appeal is one without
any arguable merit. 32 Once the court has determined that an ap-
peal is frivolous, it may then invoke the provisions of rule 38 as a
means of alleviating the burden imposed upon the party which
has had to defend an appeal that should not have been taken. 33
parties, of penalizing a party for unnecessarily wasting the time and resources of
the court." Fluoro Elec. Corp. v. Branford Assocs., 489 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir.
1973) (citations omitted). See generally Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain
Federal Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845 (discussing effects of frivolous appeals on
workload of appellate courts and preparing new rule requiring sanctions); Ober-
man, Federal Courts Commentary-Coping with the Rising Caseload II: Defining the Friv-
olous Civil Appeal, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1057 (1981) (deterring frivolous appeals
protects litigants who have meritorious appeals).
31. FED. R. App. P. 38.
32. See Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir.
1986) (appeal that "from the beginning was utterly without merit"; rule 38
award of attorneys' fees and double costs). See also Ruderer v. Fines, 614 F.2d
1128 (7th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit in Ruderer ruled that in deciding
whether to award rule 38 damages, a court of appeals must first determine that
the appeal is frivolous, which is "something more ... than an unsuccessful ap-
peal." Id. at 1132 (citation omitted). The court is to determine if the appeal was
prosecuted with "no reasonable expectation of altering the district court's judg-
ment and for the purpose of delay or harrassment or out of sheer obstinacy." Id.
Several circuit courts have ruled that appeals were frivolous. See, e.g., Sun Ships,
785 F.2d 59; United States v. Isenhower, 754 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1985); Asberry v.
United States Postal Serv., 692 F.2d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Bank of Canton v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980); Self v. Self, 614 F.2d 1026 (5th
Cir. 1980); Exhibiters Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 543 F.2d
1106 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977). For examples of cases in
which circuit courts have decided that appeals were not frivolous or brought for
delay, see Sauers v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 64, 70 n.9 (3d Cir. 1985); Howell v.
Marmpegaso Compania Naviera, 536 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1976); Schokbeton In-
dus. v. Schokbeton Prod. Corp., 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972); Moses v. Wash-
ington Parish School Bd., 421 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1970).
The question of whether an appeal is frivolous often arises in contexts other
than the awarding of costs. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
In Anders, the Supreme Court discussed guidelines regulating when court-ap-
pointed counsel in an informa pauperis case can seek leave to withdraw as counsel
once an appeal is taken. Id. at 739. In order to allow withdrawal, a court must
determine that the appeal raises no questions of arguable merit, or, in other
words, that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Id. at 744-45. Therefore, in cases
raising the issue of whether an appeal is frivolous, instruction may be obtained
by looking at Anders-type cases. See, e.g., Government of the Canal Zone v.
O'Connor, 460 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1972) (no merit in appeal and attorney's
motion to withdraw granted, as appeal dismissed); United States v. Crawford,
446 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1971) (no merit in appeal and attorney's motion to with-
draw granted, as appeal dismissed); United States v. Minor, 444 F.2d 521 (5th
Cir. 1971) (counsel's motion to withdraw appeal of guilty plea granted, citing
Anders).
33. See Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir.
1986) (attorneys' fees and double costs awarded to compensate party defending
on appeal); Clarion Corp. v. American Homes Prod. Corp., 494 F.2d 860, 865-
66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974). In Clarion, the appellant agreed to
1014 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1005
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The Third Circuit has awarded attorneys' fees and double
costs under 38,34 although the court has observed that it is also
"sensitive to the need for the courts to remain open to all who
seek in good faith to invoke the protection of law." 3 5
In a case that predated the enactment of rule 38,36 the Third
Circuit exercised its authority under the analogous 28 U.S.C.
§ 191237 to make a rule 38-type award. In that case, the Third
Circuit not only declared that the appeal was frivolous but also
required that the appellant's brief be stricken from the record for
containing "false and scandalous" matter.3 8 The court awarded
printing fees to the appellees as well as a flat sum to cover attor-
ney fees and related expenses of the appeal.3 9
a settlement but then refused to execute it. 494 F.2d at 862. The court stated,
"Rule 38 was designed to penalize litigants for just such tactics as these and to
compensate those who have been put to the expense of answering such wholly
frivolous appeals." Id. at 865-66. See also Whitney v. Cook, 99 U.S. 607 (1878)
(Court stated that it will suppress evil of resorting to its jurisdiction upon frivo-
lous grounds by awarding damages); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651
F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant has right to be free from costly, frivolous
suits).
34. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1986)
(award of attorneys' fees and double costs under rule 38); United States v.
Isenhower, 754 F.2d 489, 490 (3d Cir. 1985) (order to show cause why rule 38
damages should not be awarded).
It is also worth noting that the Third Circuit will affirm awards made by
district courts pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc.,
788 F.2d 151, 156-58 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussion of FED. R. Civ. P. 11); Eaven-
son, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985). See also
Sauers v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1985) (award of damages for friv-
olous appeal under 26 U.S.C. § 6673 (1982)).
35. Sauers v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 64, 70 n.9 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting
Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1418 (5th Cir. 1984)). See also Mid-
Jersey Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity Mortgage Investors, 518 F.2d 640, 642 n.1 (3d Cir.
1975) (appeal not "so devoid of merit as to warrant an award of damages for
bringing a frivolous appeal"); United States ex rel. Soda v. Montgomery, 269
F.2d 752, 758 (3d Cir. 1959). In Soda, which preceded the enactment of rule 38,
and which was decided under a local rule that gave damages for delay, the court
refused to award delay damages but with the following caveat: "while the full
record reveals little real excuse for this second appeal, enforcement of the [delay
damages] rule is discretionary. We will withhold its application in this instance.
This is not to be at all interpreted as any precedent for the future in a compara-
ble situation." Id.
36. Ginsburg v. Stern, 295 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982). Section 1912 provides that when a judgment
is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the court has the discre-
tion to allow the prevailing party "just damages for his delay, and single or
double costs." Id. For a discussion of the history of this legislation, see Marti-
neau, supra note 30, at 857-58.
38. 295 F.2d at 698.
39. Id. Other circuits as well as the Third Circuit have applied rule 38 and
determined that certain appeals were frivolous. See, e.g., TIF Instruments, Inc. v.
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Once an appeal is determined to be frivolous, the court will
then either dismiss the appeal40 or affirm the appealed decision. 4 1
In either instance, the appellee as the prevailing party will be enti-
tled to costs.
A court may impose double costs as a penalty for bringing a
frivolous appeal,42 and may also impose damages unrelated to the
amount of costs.
43
Colette, 713 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1983) (failure to conduct discovery or answer
interrogatories); McCoy v. Gordon, 709 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1983) (appeal lacks
all substance); Collins v. Amoco Prod. Co., 706 F.2d 1114 (11 th Cir. 1983) (in
light of Supreme Court's determination that order denying disqualification mo-
tion is not appealable, attempted appeal was frivolous); General Brewing Co. v.
Law Firm of Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanea, Peterson & O'Hearn, 694
F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1982) (appellant distorted trial court record); Hastings v.
Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 676 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1982) (order not final
and thus unappealable because plaintiff's claim for damages was still pending);
In re Newport Harbor Assocs., 589 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1978) (failure to comply
with six-month limitation period which is prerequisite to relief); White v. United
States, 588 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff unable to present his claims intelli-
gibly); Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.) (delay in dis-
charge of matters), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); Mancuso v. Indian Harbor
Belt R.R., 568 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding most of material in appellant's
brief irrelevant); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(plaintiff pressed appeal notwithstanding clear law to contrary).
40. See, e.g., Asberry v. United States Postal Serv., 692 F.2d 1378 (Fed. Cir.
1982); Bank of Canton v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980); Ex-
hibitors' Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 543 F.2d 1106 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); United States v. Eads, 480 F.2d 131, 133
(5th Cir. 1973); Government of the Canal Zone v. O'Connor, 460 F.2d 1004 (5th
Cir. 1972); Willis v. United States Bd. of Parole, 451 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Minor, 444 F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Poulis v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867-70 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussion of
sanction; court emphasized extreme nature of dismissal as sanction but ruled
that district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing case).
In In re Universal Minerals, Inc., 755 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1985), the Third
Circuit repeatedly directed counsel for the appellant to respond to appellee's
jurisdictional argument. Counsel failed to respond, and the court stated that
this failure warranted dismissal of the appeal. Id. at 313.
41. See, e.g., McCoy v. Gordon, 709 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1983); Collins v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 706 F.2d 1114 (11 th Cir. 1983); Mancuso v. Indian Harbor
Belt R.R., 568 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1978); Clarion Corp. v. American Home Prod.
Corp., 494 F.2d 860, 865-66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974); Fluoro
Elec. Corp. v. Branford Assoc., 489 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1973); Lightfoot v.
Weis, 213 F.2d 847, 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
42. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir.
1986); United States v. Nesglo, Inc., 744 F.2d 887, 892 (1st Cir. 1984); see also
Savers v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 64, 70 n.9 (3d Cir. 1985).
43. See, e.g., In re Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981)
($5000 imposed for damages), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982); Ruderer v.
Fines, 614 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1980) ($2,500 in damages imposed and
double costs); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d
35, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1978) ($2,500 damages and double costs). But see Lake Utopia
Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1979) (frivo-
lous appeal, but damages and costs denied to appellee who based rule 38 claim
12
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In addition, rule 38 allows attorneys' fees as one form of
sanction against a party bringing an appeal that does not merit
appellate attention. 44 Although rule 38 does not specifically men-
tion attorneys' fees,4 5 some circuits, including the Third Circuit,
have construed rule 38 as allowing the award of attorneys' fees to
on statements made by opposing counsel at pre-argument conference), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980).
44. FED. R. App. P. 38 advisory committee note.
45. For the text of rule 38, see supra text accompanying note 30. Under
rule 39, attorneys' fees are not considered "costs." This is the "American" rule.
See Market v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3016 (1985) ("[u]nlike in England, such
costs generally had not included attorney's fees"); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (American rule traditionally re-
quired each party in lawsuit to bear own attorneys' fees).
Federal courts are no longer permitted to employ their equitable powers to
award attorneys' fees to litigants under a "private attorney general doctrine."
See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 209. In Alyeska, the Court stated:
Congress itself presumably has the power and judgment to pick
and choose among its statutes and to allow attorneys' fees under some,
but not others. But it would be difficult, indeed, for the courts, without
legislative guidance, to consider some statutes important and others
unimportant and to allow attorneys' fees only in connection with the
former.
Id. at 263-64. See generally Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 277, 284-85 (1981) (discussing federal courts' adoption of doc-
trine in the early 1970s in response to limitations of common benefit and bad
faith exceptions).
There are certain exceptions to the American rule. See Rothenberg v. Se-
curity Management Co., 736 F.2d 1470, 1471 (1984) (courts have developed bad
faith exception so that fees will be awarded if attorney acted in "bad faith vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons") (citation omitted). See also Green,
From Here to Attorney's Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairness in the Journey to the Ap-
pellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 207, 209-10 (1983) (recognizing current ex-
ceptions as: fee-shifting pursuant to contract, penalty for bad faith conduct or
wilful violation of court order, statutory and common fund and benefit excep-
tions); Note, supra, at 281-84 (discussing bad faith exceptions).
The majority of the exceptions to the American rule are statutory, however.
See generally, Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3036-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing over
100 fee-shifting statutes); Note, supra, at 286 ("Because the Alyeska Court . . .
rejected the private attorney general rationale, express statutory fee authoriza-
tion has become the primary vehicle through which attorney's fees may be
awarded in the federal court system."). It has been suggested that the most
significant of these statutes is the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 (Fee Awards Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-
481, 94 Stat. 2330 (1980)). Note, supra, at 287-88. The Third Circuit recently
awarded attorney's fees under the Fee Awards Act in Helm v. Hewitt, 780 F.2d
367, 368 (3d Cir. 1986).
Counsel should also be alert to the possibility that attorneys' fees may be
available as part of the costs in a given case. See Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3036 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). See also Green, supra, at 259-68.
Where attorneys' fees are available, they will probably be calculated using
the "lodestar" technique in the absence of statutes to the contrary. See Lindy
Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161,
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the party defending a frivolous appeal. 46 Some of these courts
reason that the expense of attorneys' fees is an injury suffered by
a party compelled to defend against a frivolous appeal, and that
compensation for such expense is an element of "just damages"
awardable under rule 38. 47 Many of the cases awarding attorneys'
fees that were decided under rule 38 simply state a brief conclu-
sion as to the propriety of such an award, and alternatively
ground the decision on rule 38 alone48 or on rule 38 in conjunc-
tion with 28 U.S.C. § 1912. 49 An award of attorneys' fees is re-
46. See, e.g., Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 64 (3d
Cir. 1986); TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Colette, 713 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1983)
(awarding costs and attorneys fees, amount to be determined on remand); Stan-
dridge Flying Serv. v. Department of Transp., 712 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1983)
(awarding damages under rule 38 of costs and attorney's fees); Bank of Canton
v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980) (awarding damages of $5,000
or expenses, including counsel fees, whichever is less); Church of Scientology v.
McLean, 615 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1980) (damages include reasonable attorney
fees). But see Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d 1113, 1115 n.4 (8th Cir.
1977) (rule 38 damages for attorneys' fees denied because, although the appeal
bordered on frivolous, no finding of bad faith was made). For cases decided
before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Twenti-
eth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 221-24 (9th Cir.) (not
abuse of discretion for trial court to award $100,000 attorneys' fees in antitrust
suit), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Sigourney, 278 F.2d
826, 830 (9th Cir. 1960) ($1,500 attorneys' fees awarded for services on appeal);
Ginsburg v. Stern, 295 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1961) ($500 attorneys' fees awarded
for frivolous appeal), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); White v. Bruce, 109 F.
355, 366 (5th Cir. 1901) (court declined to decide whether attorneys' fees
should be assessed in suit based on writ of error, but court refused such fees in
this case).
47. See Standridge Flying Serv. v. Dep't of Transp., 712 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir.
1983) (court granted reasonable attorneys' fees of $2,060 incurred by appellee
in connection with frivolous appeal; fees were granted under court's rule 38
power); Bank of Canton v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980)
(under rule 38 court granted double costs and damages or actual expenses of
appeal, including counsel fees, whichever sum was less); Church of Scientology
v. McLean, 615 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1980) (under rule 38 court granted double
costs and damages to appellee, including reasonable attorney's fees).
48. See TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Colette, 713 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1983) (at-
torney held liable for portion of costs and attorneys' fees awarded solely under
rule 38 against client); Standridge Flying Serv. v. Department of Transp., 712
F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1983) (damages of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees
awarded solely under rule 38); Sunset Plaza, Inc. v. Davies, 546 F.2d 232 (8th
Cir. 1976) (attorneys' fees assessed against secured creditor solely under rule
38). The Third Circuit's decision in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co.,
785 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986) contains a detailed discussion of the propriety of its
award.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982). Section 1912, like rule 38, does not specifi-
cally mention attorneys' fees. See id. Section 1912 provides: "Where ajudgment
is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the court in its discretion
may adjudge to the prevailing party just damages for his delay, and single or
double costs." Id. See also Overmyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 554 F.2d 539,
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served for particularly egregious cases,50 unless authorized by
statute. An example of a statutory award of attorneys' fees is their
award in age discrimination suits when the employee prevails.5 '
When the district court awards attorneys' fees, review on ap-
peal is limited to a consideration of whether the district court
543 (2d Cir. 1977). The Overmyer court awarded double costs and attorneys' fees
under its rule 38 and § 1912 discretion. Id.
In Overmyer, a New York state court entered judgment against the plaintiffs.
The state court also directed the plaintiffs to indemnify a surety on an appeal
bond seeking injunctive relief and damages against the surety. Id. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the surety's
motion to dismiss. Id. The Second Circuit determined that the appeal was frivo-
lous as the claims could have been brought before a state court. Id. at 543.
Thus, the court stated that it would award double costs and attorney's fees
under its rule 38 and § 1912 discretion. Id. For examples of other cases decided
under the courts' § 1912 authority, see Exhibitors Poster Exch. v. Nat'l Screen
Serv. Corp., 543 F.2d 1106, 1107 (5th Cir. 1976) (case remanded to determine
amount of costs and damages to be awarded to appellees under § 1912), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Dunscombe v. Sayle, 340 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.) (appeal
frivolous and appellee awarded double costs under § 1912 authority), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 814 (1965); Ginsberg v. Stern, 295 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1961) (frivolous
appeal), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
50. See Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir.
1986) (appeal "that from the beginning was utterly without merit"); Overmyer v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 554 F.2d 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1977) ("This court has been
utilized . . . as a device to frustrate the collection of a judgment of a state
court."); In re Sunset Plaza, Inc., 546 F.2d 232, 234 n.l (8th Cir. 1976) (in bank-
ruptcy proceeding, court noted that record disclosed "nonsensical whipsaw ap-
peals" over course of seven-year litigation that included over 700 pleadings);
Exhibitors Poster Exch. v. Nat'l Serv. Corp., 543 F.2d 1100, 1106-07 (5th Cir.
1976) (sole issue had been litigated and appealed before; appellant merely had
"forlorn hope" that court would overrule earlier decision), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
938 (1977); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975)(arguments clearly contrary to congressional policy and caselaw); Dunscombe v.
Sayle, 340 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.) (appeal "potentially" frivolous), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 814 (1965). Cf Dow Chem. Co. v. M/V Gulf Seas, 593 F.2d 613, 614-15
(5th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing cases where appeal was "potentially frivolous").
51. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) authorizes the award of attorneys' fees in age dis-
crimination suits. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See also Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569
F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977) (remanded for recalculation of attorney fee award to
reflect value of time devoted to case, noting that 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) incorpo-
rates 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which allows for attorneys' fees under Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977)(awarding attorneys' fees), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, 584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978);
Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., 500 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (awarding at-
torneys' fees in accordance with agreement between plaintiff and his attorney).
Numerous other federal statutes also authorize the award of attorneys' fees
to prevailing parties. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7 7 0 1(g)(1) (1982) (Civil Service Re-
form Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1982) (Consumer Product Safety Commission Im-
provements Act); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982) (Copyrights Act). For a brief
discussion of the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, which also authorizes the award of
attorneys' fees to prevailing parties, see supra note 45.
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abused its discretion.52 To determine the value of a lawyer's ser-
vice, an affidavit will suffice as proof 5 3 There is no need for ex-
pert testimony since the judge is assumed to be an expert in this
area.
54
In a class action suit where the attorney who represented the
class sought compensation out of the settlement award to class
members who did not pursue the suit, the Third Circuit ruled that
the district court should consider the following factors when de-
termining compensation for an attorney: (1) the amount of the
attorney's time expended in the effort; (2) the value of the attor-
ney's services, to be ascertained by examining such factors as the
normal billing rate and the attorney's reputation and status (part-
ner, associate); (3) the "contingent nature of success"; and
52. Tranberg v. Tranberg, 456 F.2d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 1972). In Tranberg, a
lawyer appealed from an order of the district court denying reconsideration of
an order setting his fees. Id. at 174. The appellate court ruled that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in a partition suit. Id. The court stated that
"the fee was set by an experienced district judge, knowledgeable of the circum-
stances and professional practices of the community." Id. See also Carmichael v.
Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1139 (11 th Cir. 1984) (vacating district
court's finding on attorneys' fees and remanding "in the hope that the parties
and the court will together produce a record of adequate detail to permit mean-
ingful and efficient review"); Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., 736 F.2d
1470 (11 th Cir. 1984) (fee award with instructions to district court to base its
calculation upon adequate documentation); cf. Sauers v. Commissioner, 771
F.2d 64, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1985) (award by district court of damages pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 6673).
In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clear Air, 54
U.S.L.W. 5017 (U.S. July 2, 1986), which involved an award of attorneys' fees
pursuant to § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, the Supreme Court stated, "A strong
presumption that the lodestar figure-the product of reasonable hours times a
reasonable rate-represents a 'reasonable' fee is wholly consistent with the ra-
tionale behind the usual fee-shifting statute." Id. at 5022.
53. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1137
(11 th Cir. 1984) (district court properly relied on plaintiff's attorneys' affidavits
demonstrating hours spent on case; court was entitled to include some hours
spent unnecessarily); Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., 736 F.2d 1470
(11 th Cir. 1984) (counsel for defendants provided detailed affidavits itemizing
services, and district court correctly relied on them in determining reasonable
fees). Accord Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (courts may award attorneys' fees on basis of
affidavits but evidentiary hearing was also required where facts to be weighed in
light of judge's expertise were in dispute); Tranberg v. Tranberg, 456 F.2d 173
(3d Cir. 1972) (in awarding attorneys' fees, district judge properly relied upon
itemized statement of time spent in conjunction with his knowledge of circum-
stances and professional practices of community). See also Berger, Court Awarded
Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 321 (1977) (for
attorneys engaged in private practice, "the best evidence of the value of their
time is the hourly rate which they most commonly charge their fee-paying clients
for similar legal services").
54. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1973).
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(4) whether the attorney's work was exceptionally good or poor.55
After setting a dollar value on the attorneys' services, the court
ruled that "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, the unrepre-
sented claimants should pay for the attorneys' services in propor-
tion to their benefit from them-that is, the unrepresented
claimants should pay a percentage of the reasonable value of the
attorneys' services to the class equal to their percentage of the
class' recovery." 56 The Third Circuit has held that these guide-
lines apply in all cases where attorneys' fees are granted by
statute.57
With regard to referral fees, the Third Circuit has held that
an agreement to pay referring counsel a percentage of the total
attorneys' fees granted by the court, without regard to the
amount of work performed by referring counsel, violates discipli-
nary rule 2-107 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.58
55. Id. at 167-69. Lindy was a multidistrict planning antitrust case. Id. at
163. After settlement, application was made for attorneys' fees and expenses.
Id. at 164. The district court granted and denied this application in part. Id. On
appeal, the Third Circuit, after developing the four-part analysis, vacated the
orders granting and denying attorneys' fees and remanded the case for the dis-
trict court to consider the four factors. Id. at 170. But see Pennsylvania v. Dela-
ware Valley Citizens' Council for Clear Air, 54 U.S.L.W. 5017, 5022 (U.S. July 2,
1986) ("A strong presumption that the lodestar figure-the product of reason-
able hours times a reasonable rate-represents a 'reasonable' fee is wholly con-
sistent with the rationale behind the usual fee-shifting statute.").
56. Lindy Bros., 487 F.2d at 169.
57. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1977).
Other courts and commentators have suggested a similar analysis in deciding
the reasonable value of attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw
Works, 738 F.2d 1126 (11 th Cir. 1984) (calculating fees award based on hours
spent and hourly rate charged); Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Trainer, 601
F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1979) (determining attorneys' fees based on hours worked,
reasonable hourly rate, size of recovery, quality of work, and complexity of is-
sues); Berger, supra note 53, at 315-28 (suggesting framework for determining
attorneys' fee award based on time reasonably expended, multiplied by attor-
ney's market rate, multiplied by risk of non-recovery).
58. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1977) (cit-
ing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1975)). The Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another law-
yer who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office,
unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full
disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and
responsibility assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable
compensation for all legal services they rendered the client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107, reprinted in 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1975). In Prandini, counsel for plaintiffs in a class
action based on sex discrimination in employment filed an ex parte appeal from
17
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B. Liability of Counsel for Costs
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, counsel may themselves be held lia-
ble for costs. 59 The Third Circuit has ruled that district courts
an order of the district court reducing the fee payments they had settled upon
with the defendants. 557 F.2d at 1017. The court stated that although the
award of attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the trial court, district court
judges must apply the formula devised in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. Id. at 1018 (citing Lindy, 487 F.2d 161 (3d
Cir. 1973)). The appellate court may then review the determination based on a
clearly erroneous standard. Id.
The Prandini court rejected the appellants' argument that the district judge
had focused erroneously on the amount it is ethical to agree upon rather than to
receive. Id. at 1019 (citation omitted). The court stated that in disapproving the
requested amount, the judge had passed upon the amount to be received. The
court then vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded it for a de-
termination based on the Lindy formula. Id. at 1022. See also Farmington Dowel
Prods. Co. v. Foster Mfg. Co., 436 F.2d 699, 701 (1st Cir. 1970) ("The very fact
that post-agreement factors such as complexity of problems, quality of work, and
results obtained are properly considered indicates that the judgment of the
court is directed at what amount it is ethical to receive, not at what share it is
ethical to agree upon."). For a discussion of Lindy, see supra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). This section provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of
the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the pro-
ceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by
the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys'
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Id. For cases discussing § 1927, see Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors, 768 F.2d 1159
(10th Cir. 1985) (district court was justified in awarding costs as attorney contin-
ued to assert claims that had no factual or legal basis and commenced suit in bad
faith); United States v. Nesglo, Inc., 744 F.2d 887, 891-92 (1st Cir. 1984) (attor-
neys' fees award under § 1927 was "not only justified but virtually compelled by
blatant conduct of appellants and their counsel"); Malhiot v. Southern Cal. Re-
tail Clerks Union, 735 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1984) (damages of costs and
attorneys' fees awarded under § 1927 where counsel's brief contained "many"
misrepresentations of the record and intentional misstatements of California
law), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 965 (1985); Irizarry v. Quiros, 722 F.2d 869 (1st Cir.
1983) (double costs awarded under § 1927 and rule 38 because of counsel's
"persistence in attempting frivolous evidentiary defenses"). Cf Suslick v.
Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 1984) (case involved com-
plicated interaction of state and federal law; court was unwilling to conclude that
actions of counsel were sufficient to amount to bad faith justifying an award
under § 1927); United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1976) (attorneys'
conduct did not evidence a "serious and studied disregard for the orderly
processes ofjustice"); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.)
(imposition of sanctions unusual; no evidence of bad faith in record), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971).
Section 1927 was amended in 1980. The original wording of the statute
required only that counsel pay "excess costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976), amended
by 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980). This was construed narrowly to mean "taxable
costs" as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 759-61 (1980) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976)). In response to Roadwav
Express, Congress amended § 1927 to "broaden the range of increased expenses
which an attorney who engages in dilatory litigation practices may be required
18
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may use section 1927 as a basis for imposing sanctions where
counsel has failed to prosecute,60 and where counsel has advo-
cated inconsistent positions within the same case. 61
In Baker Industries v. Cerberus, Ltd. ,62 a district court assessed
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses against counsel under section
1927 for disregarding a clear and voluntary stipulation to accept
as final a master's decision on certain issues. 63 By attacking the
proceedings before the master, counsel "considerably extended a
procedure which had the primary purpose of providing the par-
by the judge to satisfy personally." Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (1154 Stat.) 2716,
2782. For a further discussion of Roadway Express, see infra notes 66-67 and ac-
companying text.
60. Titus v. Mercedes Benz, 695 F.2d 746, 749 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982). In Titus,
the Third Circuit considered whether the district court had abused its discretion
in dismissing the appellant's claim with prejudice. Id. at 746-47. The district
court based its decision upon reports of a United States magistrate showing that
the plaintiff's counsel was consistently unprepared at pretrial conferences. Id. at
747. The district court never considered any less severe sanctions. Id. The
Third Circuit noted that "district courts should be reluctant to deprive a plaintiff
of the right to have his claim adjudicated on the merits." Id. at 747 (citations
omitted). The court vacated the district court order and remanded the case for
consideration of less severe sanctions. Id. at 746. In the course of its discussion
of less severe sanctions, the court mentioned § 1927 as one remedy. Id. at 749
n.6.
61. Bloom v. Barry, 755 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1985). In Bloom, the plaintiff
commenced a breach of warranty suit in a Florida state court. He also sought
relief under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Id. at 356. Under this Act, fed-
eral question jurisdiction could only be obtained if the amount in controversy
exceeded $50,000. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B) (1982)). The defendant
had the case removed to the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida by alleging diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy
exceeding $10,000. Id. at 356-57 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982)). The South-
ern District of Florida transferred the case to the District of New Jersey upon the
defendant's motion. Id. at 357.
After transfer, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The defendant claimed that the court
lacked jurisdiction over the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim because it was
for less than $50,000, and the state law breach of warranty claim could not result
in ajudgment in excess of$10,000. Id. The District Court of New Jersey denied
the motion to dismiss and remanded the case to a New Jersey Superior Court.
Id. The plaintiff petitioned the Third Circuit for a writ of mandamus, directing
the district court to vacate its order. Id. The court granted the petition. Id. at
358. In remanding the case to the district court to determine whether under
Florida law the plaintiff could not recover over $10,000, the court stated:
The odyssey to which Mr. Bloom and his counsel have been subjected
as a result of the inconsistent positions taken by [the real defendant]
with respect to the jurisdictional amount suggests that consideration by
the district court of an award of excess costs, expenses and attorneys'
fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) may be appropriate.
Id.
62. 570 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1983).
63. Id. at 1238.
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ties with a faster and less expensive way of resolving the signifi-
cant disputes between them."'64
Courts have also used rule 38 and section 1927 in conjunc-
tion to award double costs against counsel. 65
The Supreme Court has ruled that attorneys' fees may be
awarded against counsel as a "proper exercise of a court's inher-
ent powers." 66 The Court ruled that this power should only be
exercised when there is a finding that the action was filed in bad
faith or the litigation was conducted in bad faith.6 7
IV. ITEMS TAXABLE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. Items Awarded as Costs of an Appeal
Those items which a federal court may award as costs are
listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.68 This statute provides:
64. Id. at 1259.
65. See Irizarry v. Quiros, 722 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1983) (in conspiracy action,
successful appellee was awarded double costs under rule 38 and § 1927 in view
of defendant's persistence in attempting frivolous evidentiary defenses);
Acevedo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 918, 920-21 (2d Cir.
1976) (court assessed double costs against petitioner's counsel under rule 38
and § 1927 for filing petition as a delay tactic to prevent client's deportation).
66. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67 (1980). Roadway
Express involved a sanction imposed on three lawyers who represented the plain-
tiffs in an employment discrimination suit. Id. at 754-56. The trial court dis-
missed the action under rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure to comply with discovery orders. Id. at 755 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 37).
The trial court, relying on § 1927, also ordered the plaintiffs' counsel to pay the
defendant's costs and attorneys' fees. Id. at 756. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that § 1927 was limited to court costs as defined by § 1920. Id. at 756-
57. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court regarding § 1927, but re-
manded the case to the district court for a determination of whether the plain-
tiff's attorneys acted in bad faith. Id. at 769.
67. Id. at 766. The Court discussed the inherent power of the federal
courts to sanction attorneys, concluding that "[tihe power of a court over mem-
bers of its bar is at least as great as its authority over litigants. If a court may tax
counsel fees against a party who has litigated in bad faith, it certainly may assess
those expenses against counsel who willfully abuse judicial processes." Id. (foot-
note omitted). See also Masalosalo by Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d
955 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Roadway Express in affirming district court's taxing of
attorneys' fees against counsel who brought suit without valid claim); TIF In-
struments, Inc. v. Colette, 713 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1983) (attorney held lia-
ble under Roadway Express for a part of costs and attorneys' fees awarded under
rule 38 against client). See also Bloom v. Barry, 755 F.2d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 1985)
(district court may award costs, expenses and attorneys' fees pursuant to § 1927
against counsel for taking grotesquely inconsistent positions). For a critical dis-
cussion of Roadway Express, see Martineau, supra note 30, at 861-62. For a discus-
sion of the effect of Roadway Express on 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see supra note 59. For
a discussion of the award of attorneys' fees as costs under rule 39, see supra note
45.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982).
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A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may
tax as costs the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the
stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use
in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers nec-
essarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compen-
sation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses,
and costs of special interpretation services under
section 1828 of this title.
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allow-
ance, included in the judgment or decree.69
Not all of the expenses listed in the statute will be awarded by
a court of appeals. Under rule 39(e), certain appellate costs will
be awarded in the district court. 70 The award of costs under rule
39(e) will occur after the appellate court mandate 7' has been is-
sued. At that time, the district court, upon motion, will assess the
costs specified in rule 39(e) in favor of the prevailing party. 72
In In re Penn Central Transportation Co.,73 the Third Circuit
listed some allowable and unallowable appellate costs:
It has been the practice of this court to tax costs for
69. Id.
70. FED. R. APP. P. 39(e). For the text of rule 39(e), see supra note 1.
71. The appellate court mandate includes the appellate court's direction as
to whom shall pay costs. FED. R. APP. P. 41 (a). Rule 41 (a) specifically provides
that:
The mandate of the court shall issue 21 days after the entry of
judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A certified
copy of the judgment and a copy of the opinion of the court, if any, and
any direction as to costs shall constitute the mandate, unless the court
directs that a formal mandate issue. The timely filing of a petition for
rehearing will stay the mandate until disposition of the petition unless
otherwise ordered by the court. If the petition is denied, the mandate
shall issue 7 days after entry of the order denying the petition unless
the time is shortened or enlarged by order.
Id.
72. FED. R. ApP. P. 39(e). For the text of rule 39(e), see supra note 1. See
also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 413 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir.
1969) (cost of procuring copy of reporter's transcript is necessary cost under
rule 39(e); court disallowed item as cost to be taxed in appellate court without
prejudice to right of appellee to make motion to district court).
73. 630 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1980).
1986] 1025
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the printing of filed briefs, appendices, and exhibits.
When traditional means of printing are employed, taxa-
ble expenses are deemed to include reasonable labor,
materials, cover, binding, author's alterations not in ex-
cess of fifteen percent of the base price and special ex-
penses. When other reproducing methods have been
used, taxable expenses include materials and the dupli-
cating charge . . . [however] labor is usually not taxable
.... Docketing fees and state and local sales taxes are
taxable items in this court. This court disallows costs for
the following non-inclusive list of items: postage and
courier fees, overtime, unreasonable author's altera-
tions, motions, and "non-filed" documents.74
In addition, the costs of making documents available solely
for the "information" of the court 75 and the costs of printed let-
ters or motions are not taxable. 76 In general, attorneys' fees are
likewise not taxable as costs. 77
B. Costs in Original Proceedings
The question has arisen of how a court of appeals should
treat costs in original proceedings such as mandamus actions or
actions brought pursuant to the All Writs Statute. 78 In a Third
Circuit mandamus decision, Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Associ-
ation,79 the court held that costs were allowable by the appellate
court when the action was under the court's original jurisdic-
tion.80 Although rule 39 does not explicitly address the issue,
Cotler held that the court would tax costs against real, but not
nominal, parties. 8' The court drew an analogy with the situation
in which a district court imposes costs pursuant to rule 54 of the
74. Id. at 191 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 191 n.8.
76. Id.
77. For a discussion of attorneys' fees awarded as costs under rule 39, see
supra notes 45 & 53-56 and accompanying text.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). Section 1651(a) provides that "[t]he Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law." Id. § 165 1(a).
79. 530 F.2d 536 (3d Cir. 1976). For a further discussion of the facts in
Cotler, see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
80. 530 F.2d at 538.
81. Id.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 82 In essence, the proceeding
was the same as any appellate court action with the standard rules
of taxation of costs applicable. The court concluded:
Costs may not be taxed against the nominal respondent,
a judge. If this court dismisses the petition without re-
quiring an answer, costs may not be assessed since the
petitioner has not prevailed, and the actual respondent
has incurred none. If an answer is required costs should
be assessed, unless the court otherwise orders, in favor
of the prevailing party: petitioner or actual
respondent.8 3
The Coder court ultimately allowed the petitioner an apportion-
ment of his costs.8 4
C. Amounts Awarded as Costs
The method for determining the actual dollar amounts to be
awarded as costs for printing, copying, and the like is set by rule
39(c). 85 This rule provides that the costs of printing, or otherwise
reproducing necessary copies of briefs, appendices, and the rec-
ord are taxable at a rate which is not "higher than that generally
charged for such work in the area where the clerk's office is lo-
cated and [which] shall encourage the use of economical methods
of printing and copying." 86
82. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)). Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute
of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course
to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; but costs
against the United States, its officers, and agencies shall be imposed
only to the extent permitted by law. Costs may be taxed by the clerk on
one day's notice. On motion served within 5 days thereafter, the action
of the clerk may be reviewed by the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
83. 530 F.2d at 538. See also In re Haight & Freese Co., 164 F. 688, 690 (1st
Cir. 1908) (it is contrary to fundamental rule of protecting freedom of judicial
action to tax costs against judge).
84. 530 F.2d at 538.
85. FED. R. App. P. 39(c). For the full text of rule 39(c), see supra note 1.
86. FED. R. App. P. 39(c). Rule 39(c) apparently supersedes the statutory
provisions dealing with certain types of cases such as admiralty, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1925 (1982), and patent and customs litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1926 (1982),
which otherwise establish standardized schedules for fees and costs. See Water-
man Steamship Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 419 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1969) ("Since
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, there is no provision
for collecting proctor's docket fee in admiralty appeals."); Volkswagenwerk Ak-
tiengesellschaft v. Church, 413 F.2d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1969) (court applied
rule 39 to allow recovery of cost of printing of briefs). In general, attorneys' fees
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Although rule 39 was revised in 1979 and again in 1986, for
the most part the revisions have done little to affect the actual
wording of the rule.8 7 The rule changes have had a major impact,
however, in shifting the initiative to the individual circuits to es-
tablish their own guidelines in determining these printing costs. 88
The 1979 revision also omitted the procedures for filing for costs,
which were moved to (and now appear in) rule 39(d). 89
Rule 39(c) establishes the highest rate that can be charged as
costs for printing. The "lodestar" in setting that cost figure in the
Third Circuit is Philadelphia, the city in which the clerk's office is
located. 90
The Third Circuit has held that a prevailing party may not
are not considered taxable costs of an appeal. There are, however, several ex-
ceptions to this rule. For a discussion of these exceptions, see supra note 45.
For a discussion of the standards governing the award of attorney's fees, see
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
87. The pre-1979 version of rule 39(c) provided as follows:
(c) Costs of Briefs, Appendices, and Copies of Records. The cost of
printing or otherwise producing necessary copies of briefs, appendices,
or copies of records authorized by Rule 30(f) shall be taxable in the
court of appeals at rates not higher than those generally charged for
such work in the area where the clerk's office is located. A party who
desires such costs to be taxed shall state them in an itemized and veri-
fied bill of costs which he shall file with the clerk, with proof of service,
within 14 days after entry of judgment.
Fed. R. App. P. 39(c) (amended 1979 and 1986). The 1979 revision resulted in
the following wording:
(c) Costs of Briefs, Appendices, and Copies of Records. Unless other-
wise provided by local rule, the cost of printing, or otherwise producing
necessary copies of briefs, appendices, and copies of records author-
ized by Rule 30(o shall be taxable in the court of appeals at rates not
higher than those generally charged for such work in the area where the
clerk's office is located.
Fed. R. App. P. 39(c) (as amended 1979) (amended 1986). For the current ver-
sion of rule 39(c), see supra note 1.
88. See FED. R. App. P. 39(c) (current version). See also FED. R. App. P. 39(c)
advisory committee note. The Advisory Committee's note states:
The proposed amendment would permit variations among the cir-
cuits in regulating the maximum rates taxable as costs for printing or
otherwise reproducing briefs, appendices, and copies of records au-
thorized by Rule 30(f). The present rule has had a different effect in
different circuits depending upon the size of the circuit, the location of
the clerk's office, and the location of other cities. As a consequence
there was a growing sense that strict adherence to the rule produces
some unfairness in some of the circuits and the matter should be made
subject to local rule.
Id. For the text of the current version of rule 39(c), see supra note 1.
89. See FED. R. APp. P. 39(d). For the text of rule 39(d), see supra note 1.
90. See FED. R. App. P. 39(c). See also In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 630 F.2d
183, 191 (3d Cir. 1980) (rule 39(c) permits taxation of costs of printing briefs at
rates not higher than those charged in area of clerk's office). For the current
text of rule 39(c), see supra note 1.
1028 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1005
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/5
1986] THIRD CIRCUIT COSTS-AWARDS 1029
recoup the expense of an unreasonable number of copies, but
that an award of the cost of thirty-five briefs is reasonable. 9 1 The
Third Circuit has also held that the printing of briefs need not be
at the lowest available price but that exorbitant printing costs as a
retaliatory measure would be forbidden. 92
Third Circuit Court Rule 17 lists the amounts the clerk will
charge for various services. 93
91. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 630 F.2d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 1980). For a
further discussion of Penn Central, see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
92. Penn Central, 630 F.2d at 191.
93. 3D CIR. R. 17(2). Rule 17 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) CERTIFICATION OR CERTIORARI TO SUPREME COURT. In all cases
certified to the Supreme Court or removed thereto by certiorari or
appeal, the fees of the clerk of this court shall be paid before a
transcript of the record shall be transmitted to the Supreme
Court.
(2) SCHEDULE OF FEES AND COSTS. In pursuance of Section 1913 of
Title 28, United States Code, and of the action of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States thereunder, the following table of
fees and costs is established for this court:
For docketing a case on appeal or review or docketing any
other proceeding, $65. If the appeal is taken from ajudgment of a
District Court or the United States Tax Court, the docketing fee is
to be paid to the Clerk of the District Court or the Clerk of the Tax
Court as the case may be, at the time of filing the notice of appeal.
When a joint notice of appeal has been filed pursuant to the provi-
sions of Rule 3(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, there
need be docketed only one appeal, but each party is entitled to file
his own separate notice of appeal. If separate notices are filed,
separate appeals shall be docketed. The provisions of this para-
graph are not applicable in cases in which the appellant is pro-
ceeding in forma pauperis or in which the United States, an officer
or agency thereof, is the appellant.
For making a copy (except a photographic reproduction) of
any record or paper, $1.00 per page of 250 words or fraction
thereof. For reproducing any record or paper (by any means
other than retyping), 50 cents per page. These fees do not include
certification.
For comparing with the original thereof any copy of any tran-
script of record, entry, record or paper, when such copy is fur-
nished by any person requesting certification, $2.00 per page or
fraction thereof. This fee is in addition to the fee for certification.
For certifying any document or paper, whether the certifica-
tion is made directly on the document, or by separate instrument,
$2.00.
For every search of the records of the court and certifying the
result of the same, $2.00.
For each printed copy of any opinion, such copy to include all
separate and dissenting opinions in a single case, regardless of
whether such copy be certified or uncertified, $2.00; Provided,
That such charge shall not be made for:
(a) Copies of opinions furnished to subscribers pursuant to para-
graph (3) of this rule.
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V. SECURING APPELLATE COSTS
A. How to Secure Costs
Under the recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, rule 39(d) sets forth the method and procedure
for seeking the taxation of costs. 94 In pertinent part, rule 39(d)
provides, "A party who desires such costs to be taxed shall state
them in an itemized and verified bill of costs which the party shall
file with the clerk, with proof of service, within fourteen days after
the entry of judgment." 95
The request to tax costs should take the form of a motion to
be filed with the court. 96 This assertion is based upon rule 27(a)
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and its definition of a
motion as "an application for an order or other relief."97 A re-
quest that the court tax costs is a form of relief insofar as the
moving party is concerned. Therefore, when filing this motion to
tax costs, the filing party should adhere to all requirements of
rule 27, and make sure to provide proof of service upon the op-
posing party or the party against whom the filing party is seeking
(b) Copies of opinions (one to each party) furnished each party
of record in a particular case, or
(c) Copies of opinions furnished those appearing upon "Public
Interest List" established by order of the court in the interest
of providing proper and adequate media of dissemination to
the general public.
Id.
94. See FED. R. App. P. 39(d). For the text of rule 39(d), see supra note 1.
95. FED. R. App. P. 39(d). For the complete text of rule 39(d), see supra
note 1.
96. See Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 519 F.2d 619, 620 (6th Cir.
1975) (order on motion to tax costs); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Church, 413 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1969) (reviewing defendant's motion to tax
costs).
97. FED. R. App. P. 27(a). Rule 27(a) specifically provides:
Unless another form is elsewhere prescribed by these rules, an applica-
tion for an order or other relief shall be made by filing a motion for
such order or relief with proof of service on all other parties. The mo-
tion shall contain or be accompanied by any matter required by a spe-
cific provision of these rules governing such a motion, shall state with
particularity the grounds on which it is based, and shall set forth the
order or relief sought. If a motion is supported by briefs, affidavits or
other papers, they shall be served and filed with the motion. Any party
may file a response in opposition to a motion other than one for a pro-
cedural order [for which see subdivision (b)] within 7 days after service
of the motion, but motions authorized by Rules 8, 9, 18 and 41 may be
acted upon after reasonable notice, and the court may shorten or ex-
tend the time for responding to any motion.
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to impose costs. 98
The disposition of the motion to tax costs will be handled by
the clerk's office. An absolute requirement of rule 39(d) is that
the motion contain an "itemized and verified bill of costs." 99
This should either be attached separately to the motion, or in-
cluded within the motion itself. In the latter case, the motion
should be submitted in an affidavit form in order to satisfy the
verification requirement of rule 39(d). All receipts for allowable
costs should be appended to the motion.
Rule 39(d) is silent as to who grants the motion to tax costs.
A fair reading of rule 39(d) indicates, however, that the clerk will
both grant the request for costs and determine the allowable
costs. This seems consistent with the requirement of rule 39(d)
that the clerk is primarily responsible for having a certified state-
ment of costs included in the mandate, either before or after its
issuance.' 00 If the motion to tax costs is opposed, however, then
the court will decide the contested issue.' 0 '
The Third Circuit has held that under certain circumstances
the clerk is without power to determine expenses, and that the
issue is one for the court to determine. In one case, the court
ruled that the following three circumstances in combination re-
quired court action: (1) the presence of substantial printing costs;
(2) the presence of issues requiring legal determinations; and
(3) circumstances such that the results of the motion depend
upon legal and discretionary considerations. 0 2
B. Proper Time for Filing Motion to Tax Costs
The motion to tax costs should be filed within fourteen days
of the court's decision or judgment. 03 This fourteen-day period
allows the clerk to include the cost assessment in the mandate, 0 4
98. See FED. R. APP. P. 27(a).
99. FED. R. APP. P. 39(d). For the text of rule 39(d), see supra note 1.
100. See D. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 10.2, at 115
(1981) ("The court or its clerk decides what costs to allow and includes those in
the mandate.").
101. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 630 F.2d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 1980)
(courts intervene when necessary); Murphy v. L & J Press Corp., 577 F.2d 27
(8th Cir. 1978) (court of appeals reversed and plaintiff submitted bill of costs;
defendant objected and sought to strike same).
102. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 630 F.2d 183, 186 (3d Cir. 1980). For a
further discussion of the Penn Central case, see supra notes 73-76 & 91-92 and
accompanying text.
103. FED. R. APP. P. 39(d). For the text of rule 39(d), see supra note 1.
104. FED. R. APP. P. 39(d).
1986] 1031
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which is not issued until twenty-one days after entry of the judg-
ment. 10 5 The fourteen-day time period may be extended by the
court. 10 6 The party requesting the extension must file an appro-
priate motion to that effect. A motion to extend the time for filing
the bill of costs should be timely filed; that is, within the fourteen-
day time period after the court's entry of judgment.
The court, however, within its discretion may allow such a
motion to extend the time for filing the bill of costs to be filed
out-of-time. 0 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,'08 stated that such
a motion would be granted upon "good cause shown."' 0 9 Laffey
also clearly stated that the fourteen-day filing period began to run
from the date judgment was entered; filing of a petition for re-
hearing or hearing in banc would not toll that time period without
some further order of the court. 10
C. Objection to Taxing Costs
The party from whom the costs are sought may object to the
assessment or the amount of the assessment, even if some costs
are due."' Whether certain items are taxable as costs is a ques-
105. FED. R. App. P. 41(a). For the full text of rule 41(a), see supra note 71.
106. See Saunders v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit, 505 F.2d 331
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (allowing bill to be filed late as losing party did not send copy of
bill for printing of joint appendix to prevailing party for several months). Cf
Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 560 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1977) (filing of peti-
tion for rehearing did not automatically extend time for filing; counsel's good
faith belief as to timeliness was not "good cause" for extension), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 975 (1977); Denofre v. Transportation Ins. Rating Bureau, 560 F.2d 859
(7th Cir. 1977) (enlargement of time denied, good cause not shown by mere
inattendance to daily chores at law office).
Inherent power to extend time frames under the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure is found in rule 26(b), which allows a court to enlarge time periods
for "good cause shown." FED. R. App. P. 26(b).
107. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 587 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For a
further discussion of Laffey, see infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
108. 587 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
109. Id. at 1223. In Laffey, the precipitating litigation was a class action al-
leging that Northwest Airlines had discriminated against female employees. Id.
(citations omitted). The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and the
appellate court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. Northwest
petitioned for rehearing. Id.
110. Id. at 1224. Counsel for the plaintiffs did not file the bill of costs on
time, believing that timeliness would be measured from disposition of the peti-
tion for rehearing rather than from the date of judgment. Id. The bill of costs
was finally tendered 11 months from the date of judgment. Id. at 1224. The
court disagreed with plaintiffs' counsel. Id. Accord Stern v. United States Gyp-
sum, Inc., 560 F.2d 865, 866 (7th Cir. 1977) (good cause standard not met by
counsel's belief in timeliness), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977).
111. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 630 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1980) (after
1032 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1005
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tion of law; the dollar amount of costs awardable for allowable
items is a question of fact. 1 2
Prior to the August 1979 amendment to rule 39(d), there
were no provisions in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
considering objections to bill of costs awarded for appeals in railroad reorgani-
zation proceedings, court modified costs for printing appendices); Murphy v. L
&J Press Corp., 577 F.2d 27 (8th Cir. 1978) (on appeal of denial of successful
appellant's bill of costs, court assessed only one half of transcript fee against
appellee as appellant was partially to blame for failure to file transcript); Oliver
v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 519 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1975) (cost of producing
joint appendix properly taxed as costs against appellant but on appeal of assess-
ment of costs, court taxed cost of printing portion which appellee unnecessarily
designated to be included therein against appellee); Delta Air Lines v. Civil Aer-
onautics Bd., 505 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court denied petitioner's motion
for disallowance of intervenor's bill of costs as clerk of court properly awarded
costs in accordance with method used in other circuits by treating intervenors as
any other prevailing party).
112. City of Orlando v. Murphy, 94 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1938). In Murphy,
the prevailing party on appeal had filed a motion to retax costs in the district
court. Id. at 431. The prevailing party appealed the district court's denial of this
motion. Id. The nonprevailing party on the appeal of the merits moved to dis-
miss the appeal of the prevailing party on the ground that it concerned only
costs. Id. The appellate court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the
prevailing party's appeal raised a question of law: whether certain items are tax-
able as costs. Id. at 431-32. The court distinguished this from an appeal of a
question of fact, which involves discretion as to amounts. Id. The court also
noted that since the Fifth Circuit had rendered a judgment on the merits and
had ordered the costs in the controversy taxed, it retained jurisdiction over the
appeal. Id. The court remanded the case to the district court to tax the costs of
the transcript and the printing costs incurred by the prevailing party on the ap-
peal of the merits against the nonprevailing party. Id. at 433.
The Supreme Court has also stated:
The rule forbidding appeals from decrees for costs only is easily
deducible from the discretion vested in the trial court in fixing them
and the better opportunity of that court to exercise that discretion from
its greater intimacy with details of the pleadings, hearings, and orders
in the case. When the power of the court to assess costs against either
party is not in dispute, or the mere amount to be fixed is in issue, ap-
peals on such questions alone are not allowed. But the rule is not abso-
lute and should not be enforced when the trial court assumes the power
to assess as costs against a fund or a party expenditures of a class not
legally assessable as such. Where a question of this kind is made, ap-
peals have been allowed.
Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78, 83 (1924).
In Newton, the court was faced with the question of whether premiums for
bonds paid by a party litigant under an order of the court prior to litigation can
be taxed as costs against the nonprevailing party. Id. at 84. The court con-
cluded that the award of such costs was appealable as it involved a question of
law as opposed to a question of the court's discretion. Id. The court concluded
that the district judge had properly taxed such costs against the nonprevailing
party. Id. at 85. See also Trustees v. Greenought, 105 U.S. 527 (1881) (appeal
allowed from decree in equity solely for costs when the question was whether
they could properly be paid out of fund in control of court); Delta Air Lines v.
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 505 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (appeal considered non-
prevailing party's motion for disallowance of intervenor's bill of costs).
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for opposing a motion to tax costs. Case law, however, allowed a
party to oppose a request to tax costs. The case law procedure
required an opposing party to counter with its own motion, and
to file it within seven days after service of the original motion to
tax costs. 1 13 This seven-day period was derived from the time
frame set forth in rule 27(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure for the filing of responsive motions in opposition." 14
The recent amendment to rule 39(d) incorporated the prac-
tice followed in most of the circuits. The rule now provides that
"[o]bjections to the bill of costs must be filed within ten days of
service on the party against whom costs are to be taxed unless the
time is extended by the court."'" 5 Rule 39(d) permits an exten-
sion to this ten-day period in a fashion similar to the extensions
allowed for initially filing the motion to tax costs. 6
D. Costs Included in the Mandate
As a general rule, the mandate will include an itemized state-
ment of the costs that have been taxed in the court of appeals.' '7
Rule 39(d), in pertinent part, provides:
The clerk shall prepare and certify an itemized statement
of costs taxed in the court of appeals for insertion in the
mandate, but the issuance of the mandate shall not be
delayed for taxation of costs and if the mandate has been
issued before final determination of costs, the statement
or any amendment thereof, shall be added to the man-
date upon request by the clerk of the court of appeals to
113. See 9J. MOORE & B. WARD, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 239.02[4] &
n.2 (1985) (prior to 1979 amendment to rule 39(d), absence of specific provision
for filing objections created problem of whether objections filed in form of mo-
tion would require delay of seven days awaiting objections in opposition pursu-
ant to FED. R. App. P. 27(a)). See also FED. R. App. P. 39(d) advisory committee
note (present rule makes no provision for objections to bills of costs but pro-
posed 1979 amendment would allow 10 days for such objections).
114. See FED. R. App. P. 27(a) ("Any party may file a response in opposition
to a motion other than one for a procedural order ... within 7 days after service
of the motion ... ").
115. FED. R. App. P. 39(d).
116. Id. For the text of rule 39(d), see supra note 1.
117. See FED. R. App. P. 41(a). Rule 41(a) describes the contents of the
circuit court's mandate and provides, in pertinent part: "A certified copy of the
judgment and a copy of the opinion of the court, if any, and any direction as to
costs shall constitute the mandate, unless the court directs that a formal mandate
issue." Id. For the entire text of rule 41 (a), see supra note 71.
1034 [Vol. 31: p. 1005
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the clerk of the district court." 18
The intent of rule 39(d) is to have the cost statement in-
cluded in the mandate. The fourteen-day period allowed for fil-
ing the initial motion to tax costs was established in order to allow
time for the clerk to include the cost statement with the mandate.
Of course, when an objection to the requested costs is filed, the
cost statement may not be included in the mandate. 9 Even with
a timely filing of the cost request and without any opposition, the
complexity of certain types of litigation sometimes requires a de-
lay in the actual ascertainment of the costs. Further, whenever an
extension of time is granted to file the motion to tax costs, the
costs will, of course, not be included with the mandate. 120
Former rule 39(d) implied that the mandate should not be
withheld pending the assessment of appellate costs. This rule
provided that the cost statement could be added at any time after
the mandate had been issued.' 2 ' The amended rule 39(d) states
explicitly that "the issuance of the mandate shall not be delayed
for taxation of costs. .... ,i2 Once the mandate has been issued,
the clerk shall request the district court clerk to make the cost
statement part of the mandate; 2 3 since the mandate has already
been deposited in the district court, it seems reasonable to have
the requested addition directed towards that clerk. This specifica-
tion makes clear the procedure for including the cost statement in
the mandate once it has been issued. These procedures similarly
would be applicable under rule 39(d) if the bill of costs, originally
included in the mandate, later was sought to be amended. 24
VI. COSTS OF APPEAL TAXABLE IN THE DISTRICT COURT
There are certain costs arising in an appeal that are assessed
and taxed by the district court from which the appeal was taken.
The determination and award of such costs are within the discre-
tion of the district court. 25 Therefore, upon issuance of the
118. FED. R. App. P. 39(d). For the entire text of rule 39(d), see supra note
1.
119. For a discussion of objecting to awards for costs, see supra notes 103-
10 and accompanying text.
120. For cases discussing extensions of time for filing the motion to tax
costs, see supra note 106.




125. See Guse v.J.C. Penney Co., 570 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1978) (in connec-
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court's mandate, counsel will have to move in the district court
for taxation of the costs permitted by rule 39(e). 126 They will not
be included in the Third Circuit's mandate. 27
Rule 39(e) specifically lists those costs which, although in-
curred on appeal, must be recovered in the district court. 28 Be-
cause these are considered costs of the appeal, they are controlled
by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 39(e) permits
the district court to impose as appellate costs the following items:
(1) the cost of preparation and transmission of the record on ap-
peal;129 (2) the cost of the court reporter's transcript if necessary
to the determination of the appeal; 130 (3) the premiums paid for
tion with Seventh Circuit's reversal in sex discrimination case, order providing
"costs on appeal" was limited to costs taxable in appellate court; district court
given discretion to tax costs taxable in its court); Lloyd v. Lawrence, 60 F.R.D.
116 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (district court awarded costs upon application of defendant
when court of appeals reversed summary judgment for plaintiff and remanded
for further proceedings). See also D. KNIBB, supra note 100, § 10.2, at 117 ("costs
of appeal enumerated in Rule 39(e), are taxable in the district court ...for
general convenience because the district court has better access to information
regarding them"). For a general discussion of the district court's discretion in
assessing costs, see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10, § 2668. For the text
of rule 39(e), see supra note 1.
126. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 413 F.2d 1126 (9th
Cir. 1969) (cost of reporter's transcript, if necessary for determination of appeal,
disallowed as cost to be taxed on appeal; however, appellee had right to move
for such cost in district court). Cf Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 84 F.R.D. 226
(E.D. Tenn. 1979) (plaintiffs were not entitled to award in district court for
printing cost on appeal since those costs were not awarded by appellate court).
127. See Bourazak v. North River Ins. Co., 280 F. Supp. 87 (S.D. Ill. 1968)
(mandate of appellate court simply affirmed with "costs"; district court taxes
these costs and clerk inserts amount in mandate); 9J. MOORE & B. WARD, supra
note 113, § 239.02 (1985) (items set forth in rule 39(e) will not be included in
cost statement attached to mandate; prevailing party on appeal must apply to
district court).
128. FED. R. App. P. 39(e). For the full text of rule 39(e), see supra note 1.
129. FED. R. App. P. 39(e). See also Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Gay Cot-
tons, 419 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1969) (in admiralty case, fee of clerk for copy of
record on appeal is taxable in district court); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Church, 413 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1969) (district court should only award actual
amount paid by appellee to court reporter for copy of transcript on appeal; court
should not award cost of duplication); City of Orlando v. Murphy, 94 F.2d 426
(5th Cir. 1938) (cost of printing record allowed by court prior to promulgation
of federal rules).
130. FED. R. App. P. 39(e). See also Hodge v. Hodge, 507 F.2d 87, 93 n.19
(3d Cir. 1975) (three volumes of testimony necessary on appeal should be taxed
in district court); Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 419 F.2d 372 (9th
Cir. 1969) (in admiralty case, cost of reporter's transcript is fixed by district
court); City of Orlando v. Murphy, 94 F.2d 426, 452 (5th Cir. 1938) (cost of
transcript shall be fixed by district court "whose officers are the ones informed
thereon"); 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982) (listing items clerks and judges of United
States courts may tax as costs).
Rule 39(e) allows the costs of the court reporter's transcript where "neces-
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/5
THIRD CIRCUIT COSTS-AWARDS
the cost of supersedeas or other bonds that preserve rights pend-
ing appeal; 31 and (4) the cost of filing the notice of appeal.' 3 2
VII. How TO PAY COSTS
To determine what appellate costs have been imposed, it is
necessary to look first to the Third Circuit's mandate and also to
whatever costs of appeal have been taxed in the district court.
Added together, both are payable as part of the judgment, as a
general matter, exclusively to the prevailing party. Thus, the im-
position of costs upon one party acts as part of the judgment and
compensates the other party for the expenses incurred in having
to bring or defend the appeal, as the case may apply.
VIII. FORM FOR REQUESTING COSTS
The following is a Third Circuit form for requesting basic
costs of an appeal. Completion of the form will serve as the
means of obtaining reimbursement in some cases. In many cases,
however, the form will not be adequate for listing all the costs of
the appeal. In cases where the form is not adequate, it will serve
as a starting point in assembling the costs of an appeal and in
drafting a petition seeking an award of the costs of appeal.
sary" to the appellate decision. FED. R. App. P. 39(e). For a discussion of what
constitutes "necessary" in this situation, see Knutson v. Metallic Slab Form Co.,
132 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1942). See also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Church, 413 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1969) (in appeal not taken informapauperis, cost
of providing copy of reporter's transcript is "necessary").
131. FED. R. App. P. 39(e). See also Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 265
U.S. 78, 84-86 (1924) (allowing premiums paid on bonds to be taxed by district
court in equity suit); Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 93 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1937)
(premiums on supersedeas bonds recallable in district court after order of rever-
sal); Lloyd v. Lawrence, 60 F.R.D. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1973) ($522 premium on su-
persedeas bond is taxable in district court under rule 39(c)). Cf Fanchon &
Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953) (prevailing
party only recovered one-half costs on appeal because party printed unnecessa-
rily large transcript).
In Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 515 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976), the court affirmed the district court's award, under rule
39(e), of costs incurred by appellants protecting the judgment on appeal by se-
curing the judgment in lieu of a supersedeas bond. 515 F.2d at 179. The court
stated: "We fail to see how the court's wise exercise of its discretion in an unu-
sual case not to require security by way of a bond may be used to justify the
disallowance of the costs of procuring alternate security for the appeal." Id. at
177.
132. FED. R. App. P. 39(e). See also Lloyd v. Lawrence, 60 F.R.D. 116, 120
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT BILL OF COSTS
versus No.
The Clerk is requested to tax the following costs
against
COURT COSTS TAXABLE UNDER RULE 39 FRAP* REQUESTED
Docketing Fee
Cost of Printing Appendix
Costing of Printing Appellant's Brief
Costs of Printing Appellee's Brief
Cost of Printing Appellant's Reply Brief
Total ----------
*An itemized statement from the printer showing the actual cost per page for
reproducing the brief and appendix is to be attached to the bill of costs.
I, do swear that the
foregoing costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in this action. A copy
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